Phil. 220 Week 3

Discussion Questions

 

  1. Kuhn concedes that "guesses about the proper way to connect his own research problem with the corpus of accepted scientific knowledge" is "subject to systematic test." That is to say, the solutions to puzzles in normal science are falsifiable, and they are critically evaluated by scientists. Is this is enough to rescue Popper’s criterion from Kuhn's attack?
  2. Popper talks about the Einsteinian revolution in science at the beginning of the 20th century. What other revolutions in science do you know about?
  3. Kuhn disagrees with Popper's account of how and why revolutions in science take place. What is their disagreement, and how does it play out in other examples of scientific revolutions?
  4. Popper might reply that Kuhn is talking about the way science is actually practiced, whereas he is talking about the way that science should be practiced. In the Postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn insists that he is also talking about the way that science should be practiced. Do you think that Popper's prescription for science is better than Kuhn's prescription? If not, why not? Or do you think that they are both partially right.
  5. Lakatos complains that science is irrational on Kuhn's view (Kuhn denies this by the way). Why do you think that Lakatos sees Kuhn's view of science in this light?
  6. What are the points of agreement between Kuhn and Lakatos? What are the points of agreement and disagreement between Lakatos and Popper. In what ways does Lakatos modify Popper's view of science in order to accommodate Kuhn's points?