Phil. 220 Week 9

Discussion Questions

  1. We have made the distinction between cognitive and contextual values by saying that cognitive values are those related to truth in some way. But if Longino is right in saying that some contextual values promote truth, then doesn’t that make them cognitive? If so, then there are no (real) contextual values that promote truth. (My Answer: Cognitive values should really be defined as those that are traditionally thought to be related to truth. The values on that list have always been on the list, and are therefore non-contextual. That is the distinction she is trying to make.)
  2. The theory ladenness of observation states that "What scientists observe depends on what they believe". Explain how an ambiguity in the meaning of that statement led Kuhn to conclude that Kepler and Ptolemy did not live in the same physical world.
  3. Curd and Cover discuss Kuhn’s "problem weighting" argument for relativism, which goes roughly like this: Scientists in rival paradigms will disagree about which problems are the most important even if they agree on the rules and standards by which theories should be assessed. Therefore, the comparison of rival paradigms is necessarily subjective. A dramatic example of this was when Descartes’ vortex theory of planetary motion (roughly that the planets are pushed around the sun in a swirling vortex of invisible fluid) was superseded by Newton’s theory of gravitation, which did no longer explained why all the planets revolve in the same direction around the sun (this is an example of "Kuhn loss"). Cartesians touted the problem of explaining the uni-directionality of planetary motions as an important problem, whereas the Newtonians wanted to downplay it. How did Laudan reply to this argument in terms of his distinction between the epistemic and non-epistemic senses of importance? Does his reply work in this example?
  4. What is the slippery slope argument that leads from meaning variance to relativism? Where is it best to "step off" the slippery slope, or is relativism an inevitable conclusion once meaning variance is accepted?
  5. Doesn’t the slippery slope argument for relativism tend to prove too much? That is, can’t you find applications of the same form of argument where the conclusion is clearly false? For example, from the fact that Kepler’s sun is not the same thing as Ptolemy’s moon (which is obviously true), can’t you conclude that neither the sun nor the moon exist? If so, doesn’t this prove that there is something wrong with all arguments of this form?