Review Questions

Answer a total of 8 questions, with no more 2 questions from any one group.

Group I:

  1. In inductive logic what are the two questions used in evaluating an argument. Answer these questions in the following four examples:
  1. There are multi-celled organisms living on Mars. Therefore, there is intelligent life on Mars.
  2. There are multi-celled organisms living on Mars. Therefore, there are single-celled organisms living on Mars.
  3. There are multi-celled organisms living in Lake Mendota. Therefore, there is intelligent life living in Lake Mendota.
  4. There are multi-celled organisms living in Lake Mendota. Therefore, there are single-celled organisms living in Lake Mendota.
  1. Answer either part (a) or part (b), but not both:
  1. Let us say that a form of inductive argument is reliable if it yields approximately true conclusions most of the time, and that induction is rationally justifiable if and only if there our best inductive arguments can be shown to be reliable. Argue that induction is not rationally justifiable in this sense.
  2. Hume presents us with a dilemma. If we try to justify induction by means of a deductively valid argument with premises that we can show to be true (without using induction), then our conclusion will be too weak. If we try to use an inductive argument, we have to show that it is reliable. Any attempt to do that leads to the same dilemma all over again. Explain this to someone "off the street" what all this means.
  1. Hume agrees that we all share the psychological conviction that inductive reasoning is reliable. How does Hume argue that this psychological conviction does not show that induction is reliable?
  2. Explain the grue problem, and how it relates to Hume's problem of induction?
  3. Answer either part (a) or part (b), but not both:
  1. How does Popper characterize the difference between Hume's psychological problem of induction and the logical problem of induction? What is Popper's solution to the logical problem of induction?
  2. What is eliminative induction and how does it relate to Popper's solution to the logical problem of induction?
  1. How does the Quine-Duhem thesis form an objection to Popper's solution to the problem of induction? How does the application of Popper's solution to normal science avoid this objection?
  2. Answer exactly one part:
  1. What are the major tenets of naïve inductivism? How does Hanson use the example of Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood as an argument against naïve inductivism?
  2. What are the major tenets of naïve inductivism? What do you think is the most serous misconception of science encouraged by the naïve inductivist view, and why?
  3. What are the major tenets of naïve inductivism? How would Whewell argue against naïve inductivism?
  1. Hume’s idea that simple enumerative induction is the mechanism by which predictive expectations are formed ‘out of habit’ seems plausible at first. However, habit formation in animals is actually closer to inductive inference in science than it may appear at first glance. Explain.
  2. Explain the difference between the learning of concepts by identifying them as opposed to concept formation. How might this distinction be applied to science?

    Group II:

  1. Answer either part (a) or part (b), but not both:
  1. Copernicus claimed that his theory predicted that the superior planets always retrogress in opposition to the sun, whereas Ptolemy merely accommodates this fact. Explain why this is a virtue of Copernicus's theory.
  2. What should be meant by the claim that Copernicus's theory is simpler than Ptolemy's?
  1. Galileo analyzed the motion of projectiles into two independent components; a horizontal 'inertial' component, and a vertical 'accelerative' component. How was his analysis of motion used to defend Copernicus against the view that common sense tells us that the earth does not move?
  2. Explain the advantages of Kepler's laws over Copernicus's theory of planetary motion?
  3. Answer either part (a) or part (b), but not both:
  1. What is the 'grain of truth' in the fable about Newton and the apple?
  2. What would the hypothetico-deductivists describe Newton's unification of terrestrial and celestial motion? What is the problem with this description? Can you better describe the unification in terms of the distinction between prediction and accommodation.
  1. What, according to Kuhn, is the function of thought experiments? Use a single example to illustrate how they perform this function.
  2. Answer either part (a) or part (b), but not both:
  1. Explain the difference between Whewell's and Mill's views of induction. Use some imaginary examples to illustrate the difference.
  2. Describe the dispute between Whewell and Mill over the nature of scientific induction.
  1. Explain the role that the consilience of inductions plays in Whewell's philosophy of science.

    Group III:

  1. What is the difference between periods of normal science and periods of scientific revolution on Kuhn's view? Is this distinction relevant to the philosophy of science? Explain why.
  2. What are the agreements and disagreements between Kuhn's view of science and Popper's view of science?
  3. Kuhn uses the metaphor of "seeing a duck and then a rabbit." How does he apply this metaphor to science? Do you think the metaphor is entirely appropriate, or is it misleading in some ways?
  4. Explain how Kuhn is tempted to follow the slippery slope towards idealism. Assuming that idealism is an unacceptable position, how should the problem be avoided?
  5. Is Kuhn right when he says that normal science does not aim at novelty? To the extent that he is right, is this a good thing?
  6. What, according to Kuhn, is an anomaly, and what is a crisis in normal science? How are the two related?
  7. Both Kuhn and Popper compared science with evolution. In what respects do you think science similar to evolution?
  8. Do you think Kuhn’s view of science is best viewed as a description of science, or as a prescription for doing science? Or something else?
  9. In what sense does Kuhn view science as rational? In what senses does he deny the rationality of science? Is he right?
  10. Is Kuhn right that our theories influence the way we see? And if there is some influence, is it enough to diminish the objectivity of science?

    Group IV:

  1. What is the similarity, if any, between Whewell’s view of science and Kuhn’s view? For example, what would Whewell say about the difference between revolutionary and normal science?
  2. Explain the idea behind Reichenbach's principle of common cause in terms of the his imaginary cubical world.
  3. What is the likelihood principle, and how is it used to motivate Reichenbach's principle of common cause?
  4. Without going into all the details, what is Bell's argument? Why is the argument philosophically important?
  5. Answer exactly one part:
  1. How does Bell's argument motivate van Fraassen's doctrine of constructive empiricism.
  2. Show how van Fraassen's constructive empiricism conflicts with the principle of actualism.
  3. What is van Fraassen's argument from weakness, and the reply to it?
  1. Explain how the likelihood principle applies to the possible explanations of the strange correlations in Bell's example.
  2. What is Simple Bayesianism? Describe a situation in which it would be successful, and one in which it would not be successful.
  3. What is the correct solution to the Monty Hall problem, and why?

    Group V:

  1. What is Bayes rule for updating probabilities? Explain how Bayes theorem is used in applying that rule.
  2. Explain base-rate neglect in terms of an example. Why is this issue important in science?
  3. What is the Bayesian rule for decision making, and how does it apply to science?
  4. Is there a conflict in science between the optimization of epistemic goals, like truth, and social/political goals, like getting support and funding?
  5. Science ought to be a source of objective facts about the world, free from the influence of non-epistemic values. Critically discuss the merits of such a statement.
  6. Explain Popper's objection to the standard Bayesian rule of acceptance, which says that given a choice between two theories, one should prefer the more probable theory.
  7. What was the problem of verisimilitude, as Popper introduced it, and how did he attempt to solve it? What was wrong with his attempt?
  8. Explain Tichý's definition of verisimilitude, and Miller's objection to it. What are the possible philosophical responses to Miller's objection.
  9. The biblical story of creation is no less of a science than evolutionary theory because neither is falsifiable. How should a defender of evolutionary theory reply to such a claim?