920: General Philosophy of Science, Fall 2004, Malcolm R. Forster
1. Chapter 1 of ms, especially the sections on discovery versus confirmation, historical versus logical theories of confirmation, indirect confirmation, and unification. Recommended reading: Musgrave, Alan (1974): “Logical Versus Historical Theories of Confirmation.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25: 1‑23.
2. Chapter 2 of ms, curve fitting, the beam balance example, the problem of many models, normal and revolutionary science, and confirmation “from above”. Recommended reading: Priest, Graham (1976): “Gruesome Simplicity.” Philosophy of Science 43: 432 - 437. Reference: Guide to Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
3.
Chapter 3 of ms, simplicity versus unification (what’s
the distinction?), goodness-of-fit, leave-one-out cross validation, confirmation
of unified models, and the harmony of planetary astronomy. Recommended reading: Cohen, I. Bernard
(1985): The Birth of a New Physics, Revised and Updated Edition. W. W.
Norton & Company, New York. The
Whewell-Mill debate.
Glymour,
Clark (1980). “Explanations,
Tests, Unity and Necessity.”
Noûs 14: 31‑50.
4.
Variety of evidence, theoretician’s dilemma: Excerpts from Hempel, Carl G. (1965): Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other
Essays in the Philosophy of Science.
5.
Empiricism:
Sober, Elliott (1993):
“Epistemology for Empiricists,” in H.
Wettstein (ed.),
6.
Popper’s problem of verisimilitude: Ch. 10 of Popper, Karl (1968): Conjectures and Refutations : The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, (
7.
Realism and the principle of common cause: Arntzenius, Frank (1993): “The Common Cause Principle.” PSA
1992 Volume 2: 227-237.
8. Values and objectivity: Longino, Helen C. (1990): “Values and Objectivity,” in Longino, Helen C. (1990) Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 62-82. Okruhlik, Kathleen (1994): “Gender and the Biological Sciences,” Biology and Society, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary vol. 20: (1994): 21-42. Reprinted in Curd, Martin and J. A. Cover (eds.) (1998): Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 170-208.
9. The Popperian response to Kuhn: Lakatos, Irme (1970): “Falsificationism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91-196.
10. The Earman-Friedman argument for realism: Friedman, Michael (1981): “Theoretical Explanation,” in Time, Reduction and Reality, edited by R. A. Healey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-16. Forster, Malcolm R. (1986): “Unification and Scientific Realism Revisited,” in Arthur Fine and Peter Machamer (eds.), PSA 1986. E. Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association. Volume 1: 394‑405. Earman, John (1978). “Fairy Tales vs. an Ongoing Story: Ramsey’s Neglected Argument for Scientific Realism.” Philosophical Studies 33: 195-202.
11.
Realism about component
causes: Forster, Malcolm R. (1988), “Unification, Explanation, and the
Composition of Causes in Newtonian Mechanics.”
Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Science
12. A
Bayesian theory of unification: Myrvold,
13. The time asymmetry of cause and effect: Arntzenius, Frank (1997): “Transition Chances and Causation.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78: 149-168. Sober, Elliott (1994): “Temporally Oriented Laws,” in Sober (1994) From A Biological Point of View - Essays in evolutionary philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 233 - 251.
14. Mysteries of quantum mechanics: The GHZ version of Bell's argument. Forster, Malcolm R., “The Miraculous Consilience of Quantum Mechanics.”
15. Predictive accuracy: Forster, Malcolm R. and Elliott Sober (1994): “How to Tell when Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories will Provide More Accurate Predictions.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45: 1 – 35 (omit sections 6 and 7 and appendices). Myrvold, Wayne and William L. Harper (2002), “Model Selection, Simplicity, and Scientific Inference”, Philosophy of Science 69: S135-S149. Supplementary reading: Hitchcock, Christopher R. and Elliott Sober (2004): “Prediction versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: 1-34.
JOURNAL LINKS: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (back issues), Philosophy of Science (back issues), PSA Proceedings, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Synthese, Philosopher's Index.
ENCYCLOPEDIAS: Encyclopedia Britannica, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Dictionary.
LINKS and NOTES: http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster/220/
RESEARCH ARTICLES:
Forster, Malcolm R., “The Miraculous Consilience of Quantum Mechanics.”
Kochanski, Zdzislaw (1973): “Conditions and Limitation of Prediction‑Making in Biology.” Philosophy of Science 40: 29-50.