Presentation on Fairness, Responsibility and Welfare

Dan Hausman

April 7, 2009

I. Introduction

Luck egalitarianism: justice makes a prima facie demand for equality with respect to those features of people's lives for which they are not responsible.

Call that which should be distributed equally "advantage."

Two fundamental claims:

  1. compensation.  If people do not differ with respect to features of their lives for which they are responsible, then they should enjoy equal advantage.  "endowment insensitive"
  2. (liberal) reward.  Features for which people are responsible never call for compensation or redistribution.  "ambition sensitive"

Logically independent

When advantage depends on an interaction between factors for which people  are and are not responsible, it is typically impossible to satisfy both.

Conditional equality & egalitarian equivalence: compromise standards of equality. 

Conditional equality equalizes advantage for some reference set of responsibility features.

Egalitarian equivalence:  Each individual's advantage equals what it would be with their existing responsibility traits if all were in the reference circumstances and received an equal transfer.

One needs to specify that counts as "advantage"

One needs to specify what things people are responsible for.

II. Option luck and insurance

Discussion Question #1: In contrast to Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen, Fleurbaey denies that individuals should generally be held responsible for option luck.  Why? How is his argument for this conclusion related to his critique of insurance?

Dworkin on brute vs. option luck

Fleurbaey:

  1. No one is responsible for their luck
  2. Measure of individual advantage should be comprehensive and take into account the values and costs of undergoing risks as well as the harms or benefits of outcomes
  3. Social evaluation should be ex post.  What matters is how things turn out, not the expectations (except insofar as expectations themselves affect advantage)

Insurance and hypothetical insurance.

Conditional equality applied to risks:

Discussion Question #2 On pages 160 and 161 Fleurbaey explains how conditional equality can imply that there should be no compensation for bad option luck. How is this rationale for holding individuals responsible for bad option luck different from Dworkin's, Arneson's or Cohen's?  To what extent does this application of conditional equality refute Fleurbaey's own claim that people should not be held responsible for bad option luck?

3.  Responsibility

Discussion Question #3 Why does Fleurbaey reject both the control conception of responsibility and the sort of self-endorsed preference or character conception of responsibility Dworkin defends? Since he winds up agreeing with Dworkin that individuals should be held responsible for their preferences, is there really much difference in Dworkin's and Fleurbaey's views of what individuals are responsible for?

a.  Critique of control views

b.  Critique of preference views

c.  An alternative approach:  reject "pre-institutional" view of responsibility

Question:  are comparisons possible concerning how good lives are that are not comparisons of how satisfied people are with their lives?

Discussion Question #4: Fleurbaey argues that instead of invoking some pre-institutional notion of responsibility, we should base our decision concerning what individuals should be compensated for by our commitment to promoting freedom.  Our commitment to freedom will in that way determine what we will hold people responsible for. How specifically does a commitment to freedom determine what we hold people responsible for?

Page 259 questions:

d.  Comparison with Dworkin

Question:  Do fundamental liberties augment responsibilities in any way?

4.  Application of egalitarian equivalence

Question:  I thought that the task was to define a single reference circumstance (however complex and multidimensional).  Why must reference situations be comparable?

p. 270  " A noteworthy feature of the Egalitarian-Equivalence criterion is that it provides a way out of the indexing dilemma which is commonly thought to plague theories of justice. . . .there is another possibility, exemplified by the concept of egalitarian-equivalence, which consists in using an index constructed with ordinal non-comparable preferences.  This is neither welfarist nor perfectionist.  It is not welfarist because it does not rely on interpersonal comparable information about satisfaction...."

Questions: 

Discussion Question #5: Fleurbaey maintains (I think) that egalitarian equivalence makes it possible to identify whose menu of choices is worst and more generally who is worst off without making any interpersonal comparisons of the extent to which people's preferences are satisfied. This seems impossible to me. He gives an example of how this is supposed to work on page 271. Can you reconstruct his argument?