A Problem with Probability:

Decision-justification and

Carnap’s Principle of Total Evidence

 

by Christopher Lang

 

[Full Paper]

 

Contents

 

The “Problem of Application” of Induction 

Carnap’s Principle of Total Evidence

Objections to Carnap’s Principle of Total Evidence

       Carnap’s principle is counterintuitive

        Carnap’s principle itself lacks justification

        Carnap’s principle is impracticable

        First proof that justification requires conclusive evidence

        Second proof that it requires conclusive evidence

Common Objections to the Demand for Conclusive Evidence

        Explaining the behavior of gamblers and casinos

        Explaining the success of science

        Explaining “random sampling” and the role of probability in quantum mechanics

Conclusions

References  

Appendix

 

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