Online Papers
New: Functionalism and Mental Boundaries. To appear in L. Marsh (ed.), special issue of Perspectives on Social Cognition.
(HTML version) (.pdf)
New: Evolutionary Psychology. To appear in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (HTML version) (.pdf)
Lessons from Causal Exclusion. I presented this paper at the Central Division Meeting of the APA, Chicago, April, 2006. A slightly different version is forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (.pdf)
Reductionism, Embodiment, and the Generality of Psychology. This now appears in H. Looren de Jong & M. Schouten (eds.). The Matter of Mind (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006: 101-120). (HTML version) (.pdf)
The Embodied Cognition Research Programme. This now appears in the Philosophy Compass, an online encyclopedia that Brian Weatherson edits. Brie Gertler edited the section in which this will appear. (.pdf)
Symbolism, Embodied Cognition, and The Broader Debate . This or some form of it will appear in a volume of papers presented at the Symbolism, Embodiment, and Meaning Workshop, Tenerife, December 15-19, 2005. (HTML version) (.pdf)
Epiphenomenalism -- The Do's and the Don'ts. With Elliott Sober, in G. Wolters and P. Machamer (eds.), Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007) (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007). (HTML version) (.pdf)
Can Psychology be a Unified Science? Philosophy of Science 72: 953-963, 2005. (HTML version) (.pdf)
Multiple Realizations. Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 635-654. (.pdf)
A Clearer Vision. Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 131-153. (.pdf) This paper won the Philosophy of Science Young Scholar Prize, 1996.
Junk Representations. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1997): 345-361. (.pdf)
The Nature of Nature: Rethinking Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1997): 309-322. (.pdf)
What is Psychophysics? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 2 (1994): 47-57. (.pdf)
Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr's Theory of Vision. Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 489-513. (.pdf)
Darwin and Disjunction: Foraging Theory and Univocal Assignments of Content. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1 (1992): 469-480. (.pdf)
Brie Gertler and I edited this anthology for Routledge Press. Our goal was to produce an anthology that departed from the standard canon of readings that seems to dominate almost all introductory collections in the philosophy of mind. There's hardly any overlap between the contents of our anthology and the contents of others, and the readings were specially selected to be accessible to intelligent readers with no background in philosophy. We're also proud to have created an anthology that gives equal space to classical philosophical questions about the mind and new questions that have surfaced as a result of recent empirical research in fields like neuroscience, animal cognition, and psychopathology.