On Intelligent Design and  Naturalism v. Supernaturalism:

• "The Design Argument". An expanded version of a paper first published in W. Mann, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion, 2004.
• "What Is Wrong with Intelligent Design?" Quarterly Review of Biology, 2007, 82: 3-8.
• (with Branden Fitelson and Christopher Stephens)  "How Not to Detect Design--- A Review of William Dembski's The Design Inference. Philosophy of Science, 1999, 66: 472-488.
• "Intelligent Design and Probability Reasoning." International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 2002, 52: 65-80.
• "Sex Ratio Theory, Ancient and Modern --  An 18th Century Debate about Intelligent Design and the Development of Models in Evolutionary Biology."   In J. Riskin (ed.), The Sistine Gap – Essays on the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life, University of Chicago Press, 2007, pp. 131-162.
• (with Branden Fitelson). “Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1998, 79: 115-129.
• "Intelligent Design and the Supernatural -- the 'God or Extraterrestrials' Reply." Faith and Philosophy, 2007, 24: 72-82.

On Evolutionary Theory:

• "Fodor's Bubbe Meise Against Darwinism."   Mind and Language, 2008, 23: 42-49.
• "The Contest between Likelihood and Parsimony." Systematic Biology, 2004, 53: 644-653.

• "Contingency or Inevitability?  What would happen if the evolutionary tape were replayed?" A review of Simon Conway Morris's  Life’s Solution – Inevitable humans in a lonely universe. New York Times, November 30, 2003.

• (with Michael Steel) "Testing the Hypothesis of Common Ancestry", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2002, 218: 395-408.
• (with Steven Hecht Orzack) "Common Ancestry and Natural Selection", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2003, 54: 423-437.
• "The Two Faces of Fitness"  in R. Singh, D. Paul, C. Krimbas, and J. Beatty (eds.), Thinking about Evolution:  Historical, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives. Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.309-321.
• "Two Outbreaks of Lawlessness in Recent Philosophy of Biology" Philosophy of Science, 1997, 64: S458-S467.

On Other Topics in Philosophy of Science:

•  “Empiricism.” In S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.

• (with Larry Shapiro) "Epiphenomenalism -- the Do's and the Don'ts."  In G. Wolters and P. Machamer (eds), Studies in Causality: Historical and Contemporary.  University of Pittsburgh Press,.2007, pp. 235-264.
• "Evolutionary Theory and the Reality of Macro Probabilities." in E. Eells and J. Fetzer (eds.), Probability in Science, Open Court, forthcoming.
• "Coincidences and How to Reason about Them," 2004, unpublished.
• (with Christopher Hitchcock) "Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2004, 55: 1-34.
• "A Modest Proposal, a Review of John Earman's Hume's  Abject Failure – the Miracles Argument.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004, 118: 487-494.
• (with Ken Burnham) "Akaike without Tears -- a derivation of a special case of Akaike's Theorem (one that simplifies the proof)."
• "Parsimony" forthcoming in S. Sarkar, ed., The Philosophy of Science -- An Encyclopedia, Routledge).
• "What is the Problem of Simplicity?" In. A. Zellner, H. Keuzenkamp, and M. McAleer (eds.) Simplicity, Inference, and Modelling.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 13-32.
• "Two Uses of Unification" in F. Stadler, ed., Institute Vienna Circle Yearbook 2002, Kluwer, 2003, pp. 205-216.   
• For the following papers co-authored with Malcolm Forster, go to http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster :  "How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994, 45: 1-36; "Why Likelihood?", in M. Taper and S. Lee (ed.), The Nature of Scientific Evidence, University of Chicago Press, forthcoming.    
• "Bayesianism -- Its Scope and Limits" in R. Swinburne, ed., Bayes' Theorem, Proceedings of the British Academy Press, vol. 113, 2002, pp. 21-38.
• "Instrumentalism, Parsimony, and the Akaike Framework." Philosophy of Science, 2002, 69: S112-S123.
• "An Empirical Critique of Two Versions of the Doomsday Argument -- Gott's Line and Leslie's Wedge"  Synthese, 2003, 135: 415-30.
• "To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory" Synthese, 1998, 115: 355-373.  "Addendum" (to "To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory").
• "The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism" Philosophy of Science, 1999, 66: 542-564.
• "Testability" Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1999, 73: 47-76.

•  “Quine’s Two Dogmas” Proceedings of the Aristotlean Society, 2000, Supplementary Volume 74: 237-280.

• "Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View" Philosophical Studies, 1999, 95: 135-174.
• "Apportioning Causal Responsibility."  Journal of Philosophy, 1988, 85:303-318.
• (with Martin Barrett) "The Second Law of Probability Dynamics"  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994, pp. 941-954.
• (with Gregory Mougin) "Betting Against Pascal's Wager" Nous, 1994, 28: 382-395.