Various Topics in Philosophy of Science - Philosophy of Evolutionary Theory - Intelligent Design

Various Topics in Philosophy of Science:

"Anthropomorphism, Parsimony, and Common Ancestry."  Mind and Language, 2012, 27: 229-238..

(with Jordan Ellenberg) "Objective Probabilities in Number Theory."  Philosophia Mathematica, 2011, 19: 308-322.   

 "Epistemological Similarities and Differences Among the Sciences," a paper commissioned by the National Academies of  Science NRC Board on Science Education (Committee on the Status, Contributions, and Future Directions of Discipline Based Education Research).  http://www7.nationalacademies.org/bose/DBER_Sober_December_Paper.pdf

"A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection."  Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2011, 89: 571-589.

(with Malcolm Forster) “AIC Scores as Evidence – A Bayesian Interpretation.”  In Malcolm Forster and Prasanta Bandyopadhyay (eds.), The Philosophy of Statistics, Kluwer,  2011, pp. 535-549.

 "Reichenbach's Cube and the Problem of the External World"  Synthese, 2011, 181: 3-21.

"Parsimony Arguments in Science and Philosophy -- a Test Case for Naturalism_p."  Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 2009, 83(2): 117-155.

"Parsimony and Models of Animal Minds."  This paper  was published in revised form in Robert Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds.  Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 237-257.

 "Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence -- Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, and Firing Squads."  Philosophical Studies, 2009, 143: 63-90.

 “Empiricism.” In S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, 2008, pp. 129-138.

(with Larry Shapiro) "Epiphenomenalism -- the Do's and the Don'ts."  In G. Wolters and P. Machamer (eds), Studies in Causality: Historical and Contemporary.  University of Pittsburgh Press,.2007, pp. 235-264.

“Evidence and Value Freedom.”  In H. Kinkaid, J. Dupre′, and A. Wylie (eds.), Value-Free Science – Ideal or Illusion?  Oxford  University Press, 2007, pp. 109-119.

"Evolutionary Theory and the Reality of Macro Probabilities." in E. Eells and J. Fetzer (eds.), Probability in Science, Springer, 2010, pp. 133-162.

"Coincidences and How to Reason about Them," , European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings (Amsterdam 2009), Springer, 2012, pp. 355-374..

(with Christopher Hitchcock) "Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2004, 55: 1-34.

“Likelihood, Model Selection, and the Duhem-Quine Problem.” Journal of Philosophy, 2004, 101: 1-22.

 "A Modest Proposal, a Review of John Earman's Hume's  Abject Failure – the Miracles Argument.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004, 118: 487-494.

(with Ken Burnham) "Akaike without Tears -- a derivation of a special case of Akaike's Theorem (one that simplifies the proof)."

"Parsimony" forthcoming in S. Sarkar, ed., The Philosophy of Science -- An Encyclopedia, Routledge).

"What is the Problem of Simplicity?" In. A. Zellner, H. Keuzenkamp, and M. McAleer (eds.) Simplicity, Inference, and Modelling.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 13-32.

"Two Uses of Unification" in F. Stadler, ed., Institute Vienna Circle Yearbook 2002, Kluwer, 2003, pp. 205-216.   

(with Malcolm Forster) "Why Likelihood?"  In M. Taper and S. Lee (ed.), The Nature of Scientific Evidence, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 153-165.

(with Malcolm Forster)  "How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994, 45: 1-36;

"Bayesianism -- Its Scope and Limits" in R. Swinburne, ed., Bayes' Theorem, Proceedings of the British Academy Press, vol. 113, 2002, pp. 21-38.

"Instrumentalism, Parsimony, and the Akaike Framework." Philosophy of Science, 2002, 69: S112-S123.

"An Empirical Critique of Two Versions of the Doomsday Argument -- Gott's Line and Leslie's Wedge"  Synthese, 2003, 135: 415-30.

“Venetian Sea Levels, British Bread Prices, and the Principle of the Common Cause.” British Journal for the    Philosophy of Science, 2001, 52:  331-346.

“Black Box Inference  -- When Should an Intervening Variable be Postulated?” British Journal for the  Philosophy of Science, 1998, 49: 469-498.

"Morgan's Canon."  In C. Allen and D. Cummins (eds.),  The Evolution of Mind, Oxford University Press, 1998,  pp.224-242.           

 "To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory" Synthese, 1998, 115: 355-373.  "Addendum" (to "To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory").

"The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism" Philosophy of Science, 1999, 66: 542-564.

"Testability" Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1999, 73: 47-76.

 “Quine’s Two Dogmas” Proceedings of the Aristotlean Society, 2000, Supplementary Volume 74: 237-280.

"Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View" Philosophical Studies, 1999, 95: 135-174.

"Three Differences between Deliberation and Evolution."  In P. Danielson (ed.), Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution. Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.408-422.

"Mathematics and Indispensability."  Philosophical Review, 1993, 102, 35-58.

“L        "Let's Razor Ockham's Razor.” In D. Knowles (ed.), Explanation and Its Limits, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 27, Cambridge University Press, pp. 73-94.

"Independent Evidence About A Common Cause," Philosophy of Science, 1989, 56:  275‑287.

"The Philosophical Problem of Simplicity."  chapter 2 of Reconstructing the Past -- Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference, 1988, MIT Press.

"Apportioning Causal Responsibility."  Journal of Philosophy, 1988, 85:303-318.

(with Martin Barrett)  "Conjunctive Forks and Temporally Asymmetric Inference." Australasian Journal of  Philosophy 1992, 70: 1-23?

(with Martin Barrett) "The Second Law of Probability Dynamics"  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994, pp. 941-954.

(with Martin Barrett) "When and Why Does Entropy Increase?" In S. Savitt, ed., Time's Arrow Today, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 230-258.

"Temporally Oriented Laws," Synthese, 1993, 94: 171-189.

(with Gregory Mougin) "Betting Against Pascal's Wager" Nous, 1994, 28: 382-395.

"A Plea For Pseudo‑Processes", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1985, 66: 303‑309.

"Two Concepts of Cause." P. Asquith and P. Kitcher (eds.) PSA 1984, vol. 2.  Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, E. Lansing, Michigan, pp. 405‑24.

Philosophy of Evolutionary Theory:

(with Michael Steel) "Entropy Increase and Information Loss in Markov Models of Evolution," Biology and Philosophy, 2011, 26: 223-250.

(with David S. Wilson) "Adaptation and Natural Selection Revisited," Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 2011, 24: 462-468.

(with Joel Velasco)  "Testing for Treeness - lateral gene transfer, phylogenetic inference, and model selection." Biology and Philosophy, 2010, 25: 675-687.

"Natural Selection, Causation, and Laws:  What Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini got Wrong." Philosophy of Science, 2010, 77: 594-607.

"Darwin y la selección de grupo."  Ludus Vitalis, 2009, 17: 101-143.

(with Mehmet Elgin)  "Are There Laws in Biology?  A Reply to DesAutels."

 “Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards?”  Proceedings  of  the National Academy of Science USA, 2009, 106: 10048-10055; Spanish translation (¿Escribió Darwin el Origen al revés?) in Revista Filosofia Teorema, 2009, 28:  45-69.

“Realism, Conventionalism, and Causal Decomposition in Units of Selection ─ Reflections on Samir Okasha’s Evolution and the Levels of Selection.”   Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 2011, 82: 221-231.

"Fodor's Bubbe Meise Against Darwinism."   Mind and Language, 2008, 23: 42-49.

"The Contest between Likelihood and Parsimony."  Systematic Biology, 2004, 53: 644-653.

"Contingency or Inevitability?  What would happen if the evolutionary tape were replayed?"  A review of Simon Conway Morris's  Life’s Solution – Inevitable humans in a lonely universe. New York Times, November 30, 2003.

(with Michael Steel) "Testing the Hypothesis of Common Ancestry", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2002, 218: 395-408.

(with Steven Hecht Orzack) "Common Ancestry and Natural Selection", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2003, 54: 423-437.

"The Two Faces of Fitness"  in R. Singh, D. Paul, C. Krimbas, and J. Beatty (eds.), Thinking about Evolution:  Historical, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives. Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.309-321.

"Two Outbreaks of Lawlessness in Recent Philosophy of Biology" Philosophy of Science, 1997, 64: S458-S467.

"Evolution and Optimality -- Feathers, Bowling Balls, and the Thesis of Adaptationism." Council on Philosophic Exchange Annual, 1996, 26: 40-57. 

"The Adaptive Advantage of Learning and A Priori Prejudice."  From a Biological Point of View, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 50-69.

"The Primacy of Truth Telling and the Evolution of Lying."  From a Biological Point of View, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 71-92.

“Organisms, Individuals, and Units of Selection," in A. Tauber (ed.), Organism and the Origin of Self.  Kluwer, 1991, pp. 273-96.

"What Is Evolutionary Altruism?"  In B. Linsky and M. Matthen (eds.), New Essays on Philosophy and Biology   (Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol XIV), University of Calgary Press, 1988, pp. 75‑99.  Turkish translation:  Evrimsel Özecilik Nedir?

On Intelligent Design and  Naturalism v. Supernaturalism:

"Why Methodological Naturalism?" In G. Aulette, M. LeClerc, and R. Martinez (eds.), Biological Evolution -- Facts and Theories, A Critical Appraisal 150 Years after The Origin of Species.  Rome:  Gregorian Biblical Press, 2011, pp. 359-378.   Spanish translation "¿Por qué el naturalismo metodológico? "

"What Is Wrong with Intelligent Design?" Quarterly Review of Biology, 2007, 82: 3-8.

"Evolution without Naturalism ."  In J. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, 2011, volume 3, 187-221. Correction (May 15, 2012).

"Intelligent Design and the Supernatural -- the 'God or Extraterrestrials' Reply." Faith and Philosophy, 2007, 24: 72-82.

"Sex Ratio Theory, Ancient and Modern --  An 18th Century Debate about Intelligent Design and the Development of Models in Evolutionary Biology."   In J. Riskin (ed.), The Sistine Gap – Essays on the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life, University of Chicago Press, 2007, pp. 131-162.

"The Design Argument". An expanded version of a paper first published in W. Mann, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion, 2004.

"Intelligent Design and Probability Reasoning." International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 2002, 52: 65-80.

(with Branden Fitelson and Christopher Stephens)  "How Not to Detect Design--- A Review of William Dembski's The Design Inference. Philosophy of Science, 1999, 66: 472-488.

(with Branden Fitelson). “Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1998, 79: 115-129.