Robert Streiffer - Abstracts
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Streiffer, Robert. Forthcoming. "Animal Biotechnology and the Non-Identity Problem." American Journal of Bioethics.

Abstract: According to Autumn Fiester, the Presumption of Restraint—the thesis that an application of biotechnology to an animal is unethical unless backed by morally compelling reasons—is justified by five ethical claims. In this commentary, I explore the relevance of what Derek Parfit has dubbed the Non-Identity Problem for the implications of one of these claims, the Animal Welfare Claim. I conclude that while the Animal Welfare Claim condemns the alteration of founder animals in ways that are bad for them when there is no important human or animal health benefit in the offing, it fails to condemn the alteration of animals in the context of important research projects, even if the alteration causes some animal suffering, and, given the Non-Identity Problem, it fails to condemn the subsequent creation of animals bred from the founders, so long as the subsequent animals have a life worth living.

Streiffer, Robert. 2008. "Informed Consent and Federal Funding for Stem Cell Research." Hastings Center Report 38(3): 40-47. [article (reprinted by permission)]

Abstract: Providers of the human embryonic stem cell (hESC) lines that are eligible for federal funding submitted samples of the consent forms under which those lines were derived to the U.S. National Institutes of Health. Some of those forms include specific commitments made to donors that limit acceptable research. Some fail to adequately inform donors about the nature of hESC research, about the option to refuse donation without jeopardizing medical care, or about the possibility that donors’ biological materials might be transplanted into prenatal animals to create animal/human chimeras. These limitations and deficiencies imply that it would be ethically problematic to perform several kinds of important research with those cell lines, undermine the National Academy’s recent argument that the eligible lines should be exempted from recently proposed guidelines for informed consent in human embryonic stem cell research, and provide yet another reason, in addition to the scientific reasons that others have noted, for eliminating President Bush's restriction on federal funding to research using lines derived prior to August 9, 2001.

Streiffer, Robert. 2007. "Wittgenstein on the General Form of a Proposition." Analysis and Metaphysics.

Abstract: Wittgenstein claims that [] is the general form of a proposition and that any proposition can be generated by successive applications of the N() operator. After explaining the general form and the intended procedure, I argue that, regardless of whether the operator is understood as applying to the set of all elementary propositions or to subsets of all elementary propositions, the procedure fails to generate all truth-functional or quantificational propositions. A different procedure, however, allows the generations of many, although not all, of the propositions in the intended sequence.

Streiffer, Robert. 2005. "At the Edge of Humanity: Human Stem Cells, Chimeras, and Moral Status." The Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 15(4): 347-370.

Abstract: Scientists have shown increasing interest in transplanting human stem cells into early fetal or embryonic non-human animals. In this paper, I evaluate these experiments from the perspective of the chimeric research subject. After outlining the scientific and regulatory background, I argue that these experiments raise novel ethical issues due to their possible implications for the moral status of the chimeric individual. I analyze the questions raised from the perspective of different views of moral status, and discuss principles for evaluating a change in moral status. After criticizing many of the arguments already made against such research, I conclude that it is not necessarily objectionable from the perspective of the chimeric individual. However, there are grounds for concern given the circumstances in which the research is likely to take place.

Streiffer, Robert (lead author), Alan Rubel, and Julie Fagan. 2006. "Medical Privacy and the Public's Right to Vote: What Presidential Candidates Should Disclose." The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31: 417-439.

Abstract:  Presidential candidates, like everyone else, have a right to medical privacy. For most people, this right to medical privacy altogether precludes the public from viewing their medical records. However, in virtue of the very public role of the president, the idea that the public may be kept in the dark about the health of presidential candidates is untenable. Our purpose in this paper is to make it clear that candidates are morally required to waive their right to medical privacy concerning a very specific set of medical conditions. Although others have asserted a moral duty to disclose, the literature contains very little discussion of the basis for that requirement. We argue that it is based on the same deep democratic principle that supports the public’s right to vote, namely, that those who govern do so only with the consent of the governed. Concerns about the medical privacy of candidates must be subordinated to that democratic principle.

Streiffer, Robert. Under Review. Biotechnology: The Ethical and Policy Issues.

Abstract:  A comprehensive anthology that covers the applications of biotechnology to microorganisms, plants, and non-human animals. It includes readings drawn from science, political philosophy, bioethics, science and technology studies, and law. Teaching materials include ethics case studies and introductory summaries of the material for readers without background in all the relevant fields.

Streiffer, Robert. In Progress. At the Edge of Humanity: Human Stem Cells, Chimeras, and Xenotransplantation.

Abstract:  A single-author book project covering ethical and policy issues arising from the mixing of human and animal material. The tentative table of contents is: (1) A Conceptual Taxonomy of Chimeras; (2) The Old Model of Xenotransplantation; (3) The New Model of Xenotransplantation; (4) Bioethics, the Yuck Factor, and Moral Epistemology; (5) Animals and Hedonistic Utilitarianism; (6) The Independent Moral Relevance of Altering Moral Status; (7) Anthropocentric and Species-Inheritance Views of Moral Status; (8) Cognitivist Views of Moral Status; (9) Potentiality Views of Moral Status; (10) Intentional Limitations on Moral Status; (11) Academic Freedom and Morally Controversial Academic Research; (12) From Ethics to Public Policy.

Streiffer, Robert (lead author) and Alan Rubel. 2007. "Genetically Engineered Animals and the Ethics of Food Labeling" in The Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods, in Oxford University Press's series Environmental Ethics and Science Policy.

Abstract:  The current debate about labeling genetically engineered (GE) food focuses on food derived from GE crops, neglecting food derived from GE animals. This is not surprising, as GE animal products have not yet reached the market. Participants in the debate may also be assuming that conclusions about GE crops automatically extend to GE animals. But there are two GE animals—the Enviropig and the AquAdvantage Bred salmon—that are approaching the market, animals raise more ethical issues than plants, and U.S. regulations treat animal products differently from crops. This paper therefore examines the specific question of whether there should be mandatory labeling on all food products derived from GE animals. We examine the likely regulatory pathways, salient differences between GE animals and GE crops, and relevant social science research on consumers’ attitudes. We argue that on any of the likely pathways, the relevant agency has a democratic obligation to require labeling for all GE animal food products.

Streiffer, Robert. In Progress. "The Welfare Argument for Diminished Animals."

Abstract:  Some have argued that we ought to replace some of the animals that we currently use in industrial agricultural practices with animals that are disabled, reduced, or diminished relative to normally functioning members of their species. Although some diminished animals are of interest because they show increased productivity, the ethical argument for using diminished animals begins from the claim that these animals will suffer less than their non-diminished counterparts do, and thus will be better off in terms of animal welfare. Although some have found this argument plausible, I argue that it is beset my numerous difficulties. It makes empirical claims about the lives of certain diminished animals that amount to little more than speculation. It presupposes an overly narrow conception of what counts as animal welfare and of what counts as a good life for an animal. It raises complicated and contentious issues about the source of the moral significance of animals. It ignores the fact that replacing one set of animals with another set of animals whose lives go better does nothing to improve the lives of any specific animal. It neglects other relevant considerations, such as environmental considerations, that must be taken into account. And it assumes that the only two options are industrial agriculture and industrial agriculture with diminished animals, when in fact, there are many other options available. Even though it is sometimes economically impractical for producers to act on their own initiative to adopt more humane practices, this just highlights the need for improvements in the overall regulatory system

Streiffer, Robert and Jeffrey Burkhardt. In Progress. "GM Foods, Consumer Sovereignty, and the Democratic Impulse: Is Consumer Acceptance the Wrong Criterion?"

Abstract: In public debates, media reports, comments by scientists and farmers, the information campaigns by both industry and critical activist groups, and even scientific reports from organizations such as the National Academies of Science, there is almost invariably some reference to opinion polls, attitude surveys, and/or market behavior. Surveys or polls are often taken as indicators of whether or not GM foods are or will be successful in the market, but behind many of the references to consumer attitudes and consumer concerns is a belief that consumer acceptance is the criterion according to which GM foods should be judged, not in terms of their market success, but in terms of their ethical acceptability. It could be argued that the Consumer Acceptance Criterion express a democratic impulse, and is a shorthand way of referring to ethical principles concerning the primacy of democratic decision-making, or decision-making in free markets. However, the ways in which the criterion is employed frequently undermine this democratic impulse, the criterion is often employed for non-democratic ends, and even if the Consumer Acceptance Criterion does have a democratic dimension, by itself it cannot be the sole criterion on which the ethical acceptability of GM foods is judged.

Streiffer, Robert. 2005. "An Ethical Analysis of Ojibway Objections to Genomics and Genetics Research on Wild Rice." Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Special Issue on the Ownership of Common Goods 12(2): 37-45.

Abstract: This paper analyzes and defends the cogency of several objections that the Ojibway (also referred to as the Chippewa and as the Anishinaabe) have against genetics and genomics research on wild rice (also referred to manoomin). The objections concern genomics research on wild rice, genetic modification of wild rice, the development of male-sterile strains of wild rice, the patenting of wild rice, and labeling issues. Although key academic and industry participants in this research have dismissed the objections out of hand, my analysis supports the conclusion that the objections merit serious consideration, even by those who do not share the Ojibway’s religious beliefs.

Streiffer, Robert. Forthcoming. "Academic Freedom and Industry-Imposed Restrictions on Academic Biotechnology Research." The Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal.

Abstract: Commercial academic-industry relations (AIRs) are widespread in biotechnology, and have resulted in a wide array of restrictions on academic research. Objections to such restrictions have centered on the charge that they violate academic freedom. I argue that these objections are almost invariably unsuccessful. On a consequentialist understanding of the value of academic freedom, they rely on unfounded empirical claims about the overall effects that AIRs have on academic research. And on a rights-based understanding of the value of academic freedom, they rely on excessively lavish assumptions about the kinds of research that the right to academic freedom protects.

Streiffer, Robert (lead author) and Thomas Hedemann. 2005. "The Political Import of Intrinsic Objections to Genetically Engineered Food." The Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (2): 191-210.

Abstract: In this paper, we articulate a view of political liberalism and liberal neutrality that requires that justifications for genetically engineered (GE) food policy be silent with respect to the merits of so-called intrinsic objections to GE food. That is, policy-makers may not base public policy on intrinsic objections, but neither may they base public policy on grounds that are inconsistent with intrinsic objections, even when they believe the intrinsic objections to be unsound, incompatible with modern science, religious, inchoate, or based on emotion instead of reason. We then use this framework to argue that several prominent views in the agricultural bioethics literature regarding the political import of intrinsic objections conflate the ethical validity of those objections with their political relevance. The implication is that the political debate in this area needs to undergo a significant reorientation away from discussing the substantive merits of intrinsic objections and towards discussing the appropriate political norms for achieving a democratically acceptable policy. We conclude by suggesting that there should be more emphasis on majoritarian decision-making procedures and possible compromise policies regarding the regulation of GE food, neither of which would support a ban on GE food, but both of which would support mandatory labeling (at least within the U.S. context, our focus here).

Rubel, Alan (lead author) and Robert Streiffer. 2005. "Respecting the Autonomy of European and American Consumers: Defending Positive Labels on GM Foods." The Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18(1): 75-84.

Abstract: In her recent article, ‘‘Does autonomy count in favor of labeling genetically modified food?,’’ Kirsten Hansen argues that in Europe, voluntary negative labeling of non-GM foods respects consumer autonomy just as well as mandatory positive labeling of foods with GM content. She also argues that because negative labeling places labeling costs upon those consumers that want to know whether food is GM, negative labeling is better policy than positive labeling. In this paper, we argue that Hansen’s arguments are mistaken in several respects. Most importantly, she underestimates the demands of respecting autonomy and overestimates the cost of positive labeling. Moreover, she mistakenly implies that only a small minority of people desire information about GM content. We also explore the extent to which her arguments would apply to the US context, and argue that any discussion of the relationship between autonomy and labeling should include not just considerations of consumer autonomy but also considerations of what we call citizen autonomy.

Streiffer, Robert. 2005. "Book Review of Gary Comstock's Vexing Nature? The Ethical Case against Agricultural Biotechnology." Environmental Ethics 27(2): 213-216.

Abstract: After summarizing Gary Comstock's discussion of recombinantly produced bovine growth hormone, genetically engineered herbicide resistant plants, crops, animal biotechnology, and agricultural biotechnology as a whole, I criticize three aspects of his current views. First, I argue that while he attributes too much political relevance to intrinsic objections to GE crops (he thinks they would justify a ban if they were sound), his arguments against them are unpersuasive. Second, I criticize his argument that the correct view of animal rights actually requires, rather than forbids, sacrificing animals for medical research. And, third, I argue that he misinterprets the Precautionary Principle (as it is typically invoked in the international arena), and provide a brief defense of it, properly construed. On the whole, though, I conclude that "Comstock’s impressive mastery of the empirical literature, the book’s historical importance, and its tremendous scope, all contribute to making this an important contribution to the agricultural bioethics literature."

Streiffer, Robert, and Alan Rubel. 2004. "Democratic Principles and Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Foods." Public Affairs Quarterly 18(3): 223-248.

Abstract: Despite the fact that public opinion overwhelmingly supports mandatory labeling for genetically engineered foods, the FDA recently reaffirmed its original 1992 decision not to require labels, claiming that there is no scientific basis for concluding that GE food are less healthful than others foods. In this paper, we give two arguments about how this conflict between public opinion and the FDA ought to be resolved. The first is the Consumer Autonomy Argument, which applies to the FDA and appeals to moral principles about how public agencies within a democracy should exercise their discretion. We argue that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) gives the FDA the discretion to require labels, and that the FDA has a moral and democratic obligation to exercise that discretion so as to require labeling. The second is the Democratic Equality Argument, which applies to Congress and concerns its democratic responsibility to defer to public opinion on certain kinds of issues. We conclude that if the FDA fails to require labeling, Congress should.

Streiffer, Robert (lead author) and Alan Rubel. 2003. "Choice Versus Autonomy in the GM Food Labeling Debate." AgBioForum 6(3): 141-142.

Abstract: In their article "Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods: Does It Really Provide Consumer Choice?," which appeared in AgBioForum 6(1&2), Carter and Gruère (2003) argue against those who think that mandatory labeling of genetically modified (GM) food products is justified merely by "the desire to provide informed consumer choice" (p. 68). They argue that because of consumer aversion to GM products, mandatory labeling will result in "most (if not all) processors" avoiding GM products (p. 69), in which case, consumer choice is restricted, not facilitated. Even assuming Carter and Gruère are correct in their claim that mandatory labels will eliminate consumer choice, that claim misses the mark because of the important differences between choice, informed choice, and autonomy.

Streiffer, Robert. 2003. "In Defense of the Moral Relevance of Species Boundaries." American Journal of Bioethics 3(3): 37-38.

Abstract:  In their recent article "Crossing Species Boundaries," Robert and Baylis hypothesize that what explains the negative public reaction to the creation of chimeras is that it will undermine the usefulness of perceived, even if fictitious, boundaries. I respond by noting that there is considerable empirical evidence against this hypothesis. I also argue that their arguments against the moral relevance of species boundaries (that the notion of "species" is difficult to define; that species boundaries are fluid, not fixed; and that horizontal gene flow occurs in nature) are unpersuasive. I also defend so-called yuck-factor arguments against their criticism that intuitions must be justified if they are to "have any moral force."

Streiffer, Robert. 2003. Moral Relativism and Reasons for Action. New York: Routledge.

Abstract:  There are many varieties of moral relativism. Appraiser relativism, according to which the proposition expressed by a moral sentence varies from context to context, is motivated by the thought that it provides the best explanation of the intractability of fundamental moral disagreements. In response, it is standardly objected that appraiser relativism runs afoul of our linguistic intuitions about when people are contradicting one another. In chapter 1, I expand upon this objection in three ways: (i) the problematic class of intuitions is larger than has previously been noticed; (ii) three strategies that have been offered by Gilbert Harman and David Wong to explain away those intuitions fail; and (iii) even if we grant that appraiser relativism is true, it still would not provide us with any explanation whatsoever of the intractability of the relevant disagreements.

Agent relativism, according to which there are no universal moral requirements, is motivated by the thought that there are always reasons to comply with one’s moral requirements, but that the desires to which such reasons would have to correspond are too capricious for there to be any universal moral requirements. In chapter 2, I argue that the moral universalist is free to maintain either (i) that any fully rational, fully informed agent will have a desire that would be served by complying with what the moral universalist takes to be universal moral requirements, and so desires are not too capricious, or (ii) that a naturalistically acceptable account of reasons need not suppose that reasons are grounded in desires. Either way, the moral universalist is free to reject this motivation for agent relativism.

If desires do not provide the basis for reasons for action, what does? In chapter 3,I argue that although there is no such thing as goodness simpliciter, an analysis of reasons for action based on the ways in which an action can be good or bad is preferable to other analyses, and it provides a promising explanation of why there are always reasons for agents to comply with their moral requirements. I conclude, however, that the analysis relies on the concept of intrinsic value, which despite being intuitively plausible, remains in need of theoretical clarification.

In the afterword, I note the general usefulness of an argument made in chapter 1 about the reliability of our linguistic intuitions as it would apply in other philosophical areas, and I also discusses the difficult question of how to adequately define moral relativism, critiquing definitions put forward by Gilbert Harman, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Jonathan Bennett.

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