Peter B. M. Vranas
Credentials: Professor (MIT, Sc.D. 1992; Michigan, Ph.D. 2001)
Position title: Philosophical Logic, Ethics, Philosophy of Science, Formal Epistemology, Metaphysics
5171 Helen C. White
Professor Vranas’s research in philosophical logic focuses on imperative and deontic logic. He is also currently working on moral dilemmas, time travel, and the implications of situationist psychology for ethics. His recent publications include “‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ but does not imply ‘must’: An asymmetry between becoming infeasible and becoming overridden” The Philosophical Review (2018), “I ought, therefore I can obey” Philosophers’ Imprint (2018), “Informative aboutness” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2017), and “New foundations for imperative logic III: A general definition of argument validity” Synthese (2016).