Peter B. M. Vranas
Professor (MIT, Sc.D. 1992; Michigan, Ph.D. 2001)
Philosophical Logic, Ethics, Philosophy of Science, Formal Epistemology, Metaphysics
608-263-3740
5171 Helen C. White
Biography
Professor Vranas’s research in philosophical logic focuses on imperative and deontic logic. He is also currently working on moral dilemmas, time travel, and the implications of situationist psychology for ethics. His recent publications include “Beyond ought-implies-can: Impersonal obligatoriness implies historical contingency” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2024), “‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ but does not imply ‘must’: An asymmetry between becoming infeasible and becoming overridden” The Philosophical Review (2018), “I ought, therefore I can obey” Philosophers’ Imprint (2018), “Informative aboutness” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2017), and “New foundations for imperative logic III: A general definition of argument validity” Synthese (2016).